by Brian Schwartz, Summer 1995

In this essay, Gottlieb attempts to conclude that Judaism is a valid religious system, i.e., it is true. He is looking for evidence that the Torah is ³more probably true than any alternative....This conclusion is based on the sum of the evidence. No one piece of evidence can justify the conclusion by itself.²

Evidence #1: Historical Explanation

In Part II of his discussion, Gottleib discusses the scientific method. The first characteristic of this method is that the truth of a theory depends on whether there is positive evidence for it. Positive evidence provides one with a reason to believe the truth of a proposition as opposed to the truth of another one that may contradict the first. Gottleib also discusses appeals to ignorance, where people say that a proposition is true because it can not be proven false. Clearly, that is not enough reason to believe something.

When choosing the best, most accurate, theory out of its competitors, Gottleib writes, ³what you want is a piece of evidence which one of the competitors can explain and the other can not.² This he calls ³unique evidence.²

Gottleib summarizes his view: ³The scientific method holds that [for a theory] to be seriously considered for truth, you must present positive evidence, the evidence must be unique, and the evidence must be true. Judaism is the only religion that meets all three conditions.² Does it?

Part III of this work is called Belief and Action: Criteria for Responsible Decision. Gottleib speaks of agnostics and atheists. He does not distinguish between atheists who lack a belief in God, and those who believe there is no god. I consider myself the former on most cases where the concept ³God² is vague and not well defined. I put myself in the latter, ³strong atheist² category when I mean by God, the creator of existence.

But Gottleib still classifies three possible positions with respect to any assertion (call it A):

1. I believe A.
2. I disbelieve A.
3. I am in doubt over A and neither believe it nor disbelieve it.

I like to categorize differently:
1. I believe A is true.
2. I believe A is not true.
3. I do not believe A is true.

My (1) matches his (1). But the others I am not clear on in terms of matching up. I do not doubt into the picture. Does his (2) correspond with my (2) or (3)? I do not know. But Gottleib draws an example where A=[Our water supply has been poisoned.] He asserts that his three categories collapse into only two actions: either you drink the water, or you donıt. He claims that an ³agnostic² on the issue (his #3) will change his mind to either #1 or #2 when he decides to drink or not drink.

Gottleib claims it is irresponsible to take either action without good reason, which I agree with. But I do not believe that acting commits oneself to either believing A is true or believe A is false. For example, I may be in my #3 (I do not believe A is true.), and not drink the water because I can live with it, and I believe the people who tell me are reliable, based on my past experience with them.

Now, in the water example, my #3 and his #3 appear to be the same. But for a case such as God, I believe that my #3 is applicable as an atheist position when the term ³God² is not well defined.

The center of Gottleibıs argument for the existence of what he called ³G-d,² or God, is a historical one. (summary at the end of part III) He reviews the history of the Jewish people, their persecutions, trials, tribulations, etc. That this tribe can survive so much adversity is unexplainable, he says, by ³naturalistic explanations.² Such explanations are those used to explain other historical phenomenon. Yet, since the Jewish phenomenon is unique, and no other theories can explain it, there must be something else going on to ³explain² the events.

Gottleib gives an example of his thought process from the history of physics. Physicists could not figure out why the nucleus stayed together. At the time, they believed that the nucleus of an atom was composed of protons, rather than both protons and neutrons, which the current paradigm holds. Since protons repel each other, the theory at the time would predict that the nucleus would be unstable. Physicists postulated a ³nuclear force² to explain phenomena.

This force is a strong short range attractive force between nucleons. This force arises from the interaction between two nucleons, i.e. protons or neutrons. Nucleons have the intrinsic property that when they get close together, they will stick together, and stick hard. Note that I am ascribing a property to things that were already known, nucleons. This same process occurred in explaining what is called the Zeeman effect, where electrons in beams are split as they move through a magnetic field. Physicists postulated that they have an intrinsic ³spin,² which has no counterpart on classical physics.

In this vain, Gottleib proposes that if a Martian came to earth and investigated all of history, he (assume the category of sex applies to this Martian) would form concepts that explain historical events. Gottleib claims that Jewish history would be an anomaly to his theory, and as did the physicists, ³add to his catalogue agencies, some new agency, call it X, and by looking carefully at the kind of uniqueness that we are talking about [the history of the Jewish people], he can read off it certain characteristics that X must possess, because X has to be responsible for this unique phenomena, and therefore, it must have certain characteristics.²

³What must X be like?" asks Gottleib. He arrives at this conclusion by referring to what X did. The ³naturalistic views² Gottleib refutes all theories that refer to properties of the things in question. For our physics example, it was nucleons or electrons. Here, it is Jewish people. Gottleib refutes views based on the nature of people who are persecuted, and the nature of the beliefs that the Jews had. So what Gottleib calls ³naturalistic views² are those that look to actual properties of the things observed to explain what they do. The concepts involved in ³naturalistic views² arise from abstraction from sense perception.

So X ³maintained the existence of a civilization under conditions that should have lead to its disappearance.² Note the argument still parallels his physics example, except that the cause he is looking for comes not from properties of Jews, but from outside. Gottleib attributes the following properties to this ³force² that he calls ³G-d² (pronounced god)

1. ³It must have considerable energy and power at its disposal.

Why: it is needed for ³maintaining a civilization involving millions of people over thousands of years.²

2. ³This power has considerable intelligence at its disposal.²

Why: It is maintaining a complex pattern of human behavior, human belief, certain values, etc.

3. ³This power must be interested, in particular, in this specific civilization.² (The Jewish one)

Why: ³It is the only civilization this power has to survive.²

4. [This force] cannot be exclusively interested in the Jews.

Why: ³If it were..., it could have transported the Jews to some isolated area and maintained them over there and had some special interaction with them overthere.² And in fact, ³the Jews were brought to the crossroads of three continents, and...have an impact on the development of world civilization.

His reasoning is summarized: ³[I[f you have a unique historical phenomenon, and it cannot be explained by the normal features which produce other historical phenomenon, then you have to infer the existence of some other force, which is responsible for this phenomenon. Then from the description of the phenomenon you can infer directly at lest a minimal description of the force that produces it. It has to be a kind of force that is capable of producing the unique features of that phenomenon.²

Gottleib is convinced that any explanation lacking in the above ³Divine Providence² is not adequate to explain Jewish survival.

Gottleib writes that the above (numbered 1-4) ³are all descriptions of G-d, the Jewish conceptions of G-d. Those descriptions of G-d are directly confirmed by the survey of the historical record.²

Is this valid? I think not for a few reasons, even when I accept the uniqueness of the phenomenon of Jewish history.

This explanation lacks Predictive Power

Gottlieb claims that is X has the minimal characteristics that explain what happened. All his explanation of God says is that the Jewish people are still here because God is all powerful and is interested in the Jewish civilization. This does not explain why the Holocaust happened in Germany and not Spain, or in this century and not any other.

Basically, Gottlieb "explains" Jewish survival by saying it was God's Will. He can use the same explanation if Jewish history were different, but still "unique," as he describes it. If Jewish history were such that the Holocaust happened at a different time or place, his above ³super-natural" explanation would account for it. He could use the same theory to explain two different phenomena and clearly, this is not the mark of a good theory according to the scientific method. His theory does not predict something that is unique.

His theory is not falsifiable

Gottliebıs theory is unfalsifiable just as Freudıs Psychoanalytic theory is unfalsifiable. Freud can ³explain² the history and behavior of a subject after he does it by positing an Oedipal Complex, trouble in potty training, etc. He has enough in his arsenal to explain anything after the fact, but he can predict nothing about the behavior of any one individual. And with David Gottliebıs theory, one can not predict anything about their future. Further, one can not even say why the past is what it is.

Gottleib holds as the scientific method as only method of searching for truth we have. Yet, his theory predicts nothing, and further, it is unfalsifiable. Predictive power and falsifiablilty are hallmarks of any scientific theory.

If Gottlieb were a physicist, he would not bother ascribing a new property to nucleons, i.e., they stick together when they have enough energy to overcome any electrostatic repulsion and get close to each other. Itıs Godıs Will that holds the nucleus of an atom together. Itıs His Providence, and we should be thankful for it. I would love to see this in a discussion section of a scientific journal.

This brings me to my next problem with Gottliebıs ideas:

His notion of Causality is flawed:

Philosopher Ayn Rand writes in her novel Atlas Shrugged:

³The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing can not act in contradiction to its nature.² (page 1037)

This view is applicable to the physics Gottlieb models his proof of God upon. Yet, Gottlieb rejects all ³naturalistic explanations² of Jewish survival. He rejects positions that look to characteristics of the Jews themselves. I conclude that the difference between what Gottlieb calls a naturalistic explanation and a, as he refers to it, a "super-naturalistic" explanation, is the way the explanation views causality. As I have said, naturalistic explanations attributes properties of the entities involved as causes.

Gottleib offers to examples that illustrate his notion of causality. He gives an example of how Jewish history can be understood only through ³G-dıs providence manifest through is relationship with the Jewish people.² Back when Haman plotted to kill the Jews, Queen Esther asked why. ³She was not content with a description of the political intrigue with its social, psychological and economic background. Those are relevant, but superficial considerations. The underlying causes are determined by G-dıs providence - what purpose of His these events are designed to serve. Only thus can they be truly understood.²

In another example Gottleib refutes naturalistic attempts to explain Jewish survival: ³The point of the theory is to provide a naturalistic explanation of Jewish survival. Even if the aspects cited by the theory do contribute to survival, we have to ask how they themselves came to be, and why they are unique to Judaism. If we have no naturalistic answer to these questions, the theory is ultimately a failure. (Compare explaining why George is the only human to run the mile in three minutes by citing his extraordinary leg muscles. If we cannot explain why his legs are so strong, we still do not understand his achievement.)² (part VII Jewish Survival The Fact and its Implications)

I ask: WHY? WHY do we not understand Jewish survival if we can cite attributes of Jews (that other cultures that do not have) that helped them survive? Why do we have to know why Georgeıs legs are so strong? The question here is: What denotes a valid explanation? I think an explanation of a phenomenon must answer the question: What facts give rise to this phenomenon? As I said before, Gottliebıs explanation posits facts that could give rise to many phenomenon. What are the implications of Gottleibıs regressive cause findings?

Is this backtracking required to explain things? Not according to the scientific method, which Gottleib holds as the only method of searching for truth we have. (part II) We do not ask why nucleons exhibit the nuclear force. As Rand wrote, actions are caused and determined by the entities that act. The question of ³Why?² does not make sense here. In essence, it asks why a thing is what it is, rather then something else.

What denotes a ³true understanding,² according to Gottleib? Well, in the Purim example, he writes that [t]he underlying causes are determined by G-dıs providence - what purpose of His these events are designed to serve. Only thus can they be truly understood.² So are Georgeıs leg muscles to strong? Gottleib would refer to previous actions, exercise, etc., and then would arrive at the first cause: Godıs Providence.

As I said before, since we can not understand Godıs Providence, or Godıs Will, then we really do not have an understanding at all. Why does Gottlieb not ask what caused Godıs Providence to be what it was? We do not know, and hence we lack a true understanding of anything. I hope the reader understands me here.

OK, so maybe we need not posit God to explain Georgeıs three minute mile. Why do we need to know why his legs are strong? Why are we even suggesting that strong legs help one run a mile quickly? Because we know about the nature of human locomotion: that it depends on leg muscle strength. We can find why he has strong legs; say he takes hormones. We can look to biology to find why hormones contribute to string muscles, and so on. But such an investigation is satisfactory only if one understands that strong leg muscles contribute the speed and endurance of a humanıs locomotion.

Knowing Georgeıs leg muscles are stronger than anyone elseıs satisfies my curiosity as to why he ran so fast. In the absence of that fact of reality (his leg strength), he would not have run so quickly. Phenomenon explained, case closed.

Joel Katz (nice Jewish name) provides an eloquent argument on the Internet:

God is the ``First Cause''

Last Modified: 12/15/94

The ``First Cause'' argument generally proceeds by observing that we see the universe as a succession of causes. `A' causes `B' and `B' causes `C' and so on.

We are now faced with a dilemma, either there have been, to date, an infinite number of distinct causes or there are not.

If there are an infinity of causes, we are postulating the actual existence of a completed infinity. Though you can have a potential infinity, some and more, you cannot have a completed (yet continuing) infinity, infinity and more.

If there were a finite number of causes, there was a first cause. This first cause is what is commonly known as ``god''.

This argument has another flavor called the ``sustaining first cause'' argument. Since I will limit my response to criticism that equally demolishes both arguments, I won't specifically investigate that argument in detail.

The major weak point in the argument is that we don't really see the universe as a temporal chain of causes. It may seem like my throwing a match in the waste paper basket caused it to catch fire which caused the rug to catch fire which caused the house to burn down which caused the insurance agent to inspect my house which ...

But none of this is correct. If anything ``caused'' the waste paper basket to catch fire, it is the conjunction of the presence of flammable substances in the basket, the presence of oxygen to sustain the fire, the nature of oxygen which allows it support combustion, and so on.

In short, it is a combination of states and laws of nature that actually ³causes² things, not another ``cause''. Or, more succinctly, causes don't cause causes.

And we cannot salvage the argument by rephrasing it as a ³first state² argument because the first state is clearly gone without a trace as soon as the second state comes on the scene.

Perhaps Gottlieb is positing a ³sustaining first state² argument. But nonetheless, it explains nothing and predicts nothing. The value of a scientific theory is its predictive power. It gives people the ability to understand this world and achieve their goals be they technological or not. Gottliebıs theory does not of the above.

The definition of God is vague

Gottlieb speaks of God as a force. In the natural sciences, forces are properties of things, atoms, molecules, planets, etc. Apparently, in Gottliebıs super-natural science, a force can be detached from a thing. This force can dispose of energy and power. I am tempted to use the physics definitions of power, energy, and force, but I am not sure that Gottlieb intends those meanings. What does he mean?

This thing has interests. If this thing is interested in the Jews, and it is interested in their survival, that must mean it takes action to ensure the Jewsı survival. How does it act? Does it go somewhere? Is it localized? Is it a physical being? Is it pure consciousness without a ³body²? If so, what is its means of knowledge if it has no sense perception mechanisms? Oh, it knows everything?

Other evidence: True Predictions (part IV) and Archeology (part V)

Why? If a sports commentator makes a few ³amazing² predictions of outcomes of games, then can we say that everything he says is true? Uh, no. What if this guy recites the text of the Torah? Still, no.

It summery, Gottleibıs argument goes like this:

1. We canıt explain Jewish history naturalistically

Conclusion #1-->postulate a thing called G-d.

2. The Torah speaks of something that resembles the G-d Gottleib postulates. The Torah makes some good predictions, and is verified some by archeology.

Conclusion #2-->The Torah is true, G-d exists, and Judaism is true.

I believe that I have shown Conclusion #1 explains nothing and is a poor theory. Conclusion #2 is a non-sequitur. The conclusion does not follow from the premises.

Evidence #3: Revelation and Miracles: The Kuzari Principle

Gottlieb writes:

³The Kuzariıs principle is that people wonıt believe in events which would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of their occurrence, and didnıt happen, and therefore didnıt leave behind enough evidence. Public miracles occurring to a whole nation are those kinds of events and therefore if they didnıt happen then you cannot get people to believe in them. Eyewitness reports are made compelling by the factors cited earlier. The manna fits these factors perfectly, therefore the manna is a miracle for which the argument works perfectly. It therefore reduces the level of evidence necessary for other miracles. Then the fact that Jews have believed in these miracles historically can only be explained by acknowledging that they took place.²

Miracles entail that a thing acts against its nature. For something to exist, this thing must be something. As Aristotle and Rand said, to exist is to be something with specific attributes, as opposed to something else. Causality entails that what a thing is determines what it does.

One might say that a miracle occurs when God wants it to, that God can make anything happen because he is all powerful. So the event can be explained as a miracle, but this explanation does not answer why it happened, as the answer is ³Godıs Providence.² Again, what is the nature of ³Godıs Providence.² Nothing is said of this, and this is the explanation, the true reason for everything that happens, and we know nothing about it.

Gottlieb concludes my saying that other descriptions of God, his being infinite, being the creator of the universe, what happens to the soul after death, miracles, etc., is made credible because it is part of the same body of information (the Torah). I do not believe this, as this is an appeal to authority, or a truth by association fallacy. It is like saying that Steven Hawking is an authority on art because he is a physics expert.

Infinite Attributes

The definition of a soul is too fuzzy to merit analysis. (I am not saying that proceeded a good definition, the word ³soul² can not label a valid concept.)

According to Jews this G-d created existence. This means that at one point nothing existed, or that non-existence exists. So that does not work. So Jews have told me that God = Existence, that the only ³true² existence is G-d. I do not know what that means, either. Something either is, or it is not. Binary logic here, come on.

And if is conscious, what was he conscious of ³before² (we canıt use that, as the time is in the universe, and is meaningless w/o physical objects moving in relation to each other) he created anything to be conscious of? Consciousness means nothing without any existents to be conscious of. The Jewish idea of God is that he is all powerful, non-physical, and conscious. What was he conscious of when there was nothing but has noncorporeal self to be conscious of?

How does this non-physical thing create physical things?

How does the non-physical exist without the physical?

But one might say that G-d is responsible for the miracles. And he can do anything he wants. Basically, this is the Jewish metaphysics. All of our theories of reality hold unless this thing called G-d intervenes. Hence, a thing is itself and does not act in contradiction to its nature, unless G-d wants it not to be so, and makes a miracle. Then, whatever we can not explain, we attribute to G-d. And not only that, whatever we can explain, e.g., Hamanıs persecution plans, are really not valid. The true explanation is that the event was ³G-dıs will.²

What, do you ask, is Gods will? Well, according to other Jews I have spoken to, nobody knows. Well, unless God chooses you to know. But Godıs will, why he does things, why and how he intervenes, is unknowable. Hence, all my questions above are not relevant, as such things are unknowable. A rather knowledgeable Jew told me that the language of time and space can not describe God, just as our language canıt describe quantum physics. Yes, but mathematics is the language of quantum physics. It was developed by people to explain things. No one knows the language that explains this ³thing called G-d.²